Speculative Leakage in ARM Cortex-A53 by Nemati, Hamed et al.
ar
X
iv
:2
00
7.
06
86
5v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  1
4 J
ul 
20
20
Speculative Leakage in ARM Cortex-A53
Hamed Nemati∗, Roberto Guanciale†, Pablo Buiras†, Andreas Lindner†
∗Helmholtz Center for Information Security (CISPA)
hnnemati@cispa.saarland
†KTH Royal Institute of Technology
{lindnera, buiras, robertog}@kth.se
Abstract—The recent Spectre attacks have demonstrated that
modern microarchitectural optimizations can make software inse-
cure. These attacks use features like pipelining, out-of-order and
speculation to extract information about the memory contents of
a process via side-channels.
In this paper we demonstrate that Cortex-A53 is affected by
speculative leakage even if the microarchitecture does not support
out-of-order execution. We named this new class of vulnerabilities
SiSCloak1.
I. INTRODUCTION
Both Spectre and Meltdown [2], [3] have provided evidence
of the fundamental insecurity of current computer microarchi-
tecture. The use of instruction level parallelism, out-of-order,
and speculative execution has produced processor designs
with side channels that can leak sensitive information about
the memory contents of programs. These attacks use cache
side channels that can be measured via several methods, as
Prime+Probe [4] and Flush+Reload [5].
When the first Spectre attack was published, some mi-
croarchitectures (e.g., Cortex-A53) were claimed immune to
these types of attack because they allow speculative fetching
but not speculative execution or out-of-order execution. The
informal argument was that mispredictions cannot cause buffer
overreads or leave any footprint on the cache in the absence
of speculative loads.
In this paper we show that these architectures can be
affected by a new class of vulnerabilities, dubbed SiSCloak,
and we demonstrate them on ARM Cortex-A53.
II. SPECTRE-PHT
The original Spectre vulnerability, dubbed Spectre-
PHT [2], exploits the prediction mechanism for the outcome
of conditional branches. Modern CPUs use Pattern History
Tables (PHT) to record patterns of past executions of
conditional branches, i.e., whether the true or the false branch
was executed, and then use it to predict the outcome of
that branch. By poisoning the PHT to execute one direction
(say the true branch), an attacker can fool the prediction
mechanism into executing the true branch, even when the
actual outcome of the branch is ultimately false. The following
program illustrates information leaks via Spectre-PHT:
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R1 = LD[#A-size]
if (R0 < R1)
R2 = LD[#A+R0]
R3 = LD[#B+R2]
In this case the victim owns arrays A and B that start at address
#A and #B respectively. The size of the first array is stored
at address #A-size. We assume that the two arrays do not
contain confidential data, that every element of A is a valid
index into the array B, and that the attacker controls the value
of register R0.
This program is considered secure at the ISA level as it
ensures that R0 always lies within the bounds of #A and
the three memory accesses are only dependant of public
information: the location #A-size, the locations of #A and
#B, the attacker input R0, and #A[R0].
However, if the microarchitecture supports speculative exe-
cution, an attacker can fool the prediction mechanism by first
supplying values of R0 that execute the true branch, and then
a value that exceeds the size of #A. This causes the CPU
to perform an out-of-bounds memory access in LD[#A+R0]
that reads sensitive data, which is later used as index for a
second memory read LD[#B+R2]. The latter access can leak
the sensitive data by leaving a trace on the cache.
III. INVULNERABILITY OF ARM CORTEX-A53
Some microarchitectures (e.g., Cortex-A53) were claimed
immune to Spectre attacks because they allow speculative
fetching but prevent speculative execution of the fetched
instructions. The variation of Spectre presented above is not
successful on these architectures because the CPU may mis-
predict the branch output, fetch and decode the instructions
in the wrong branch, but it cannot execute the two memory
reads. This prevents the speculative leakage.
During our experiments we discovered that the above claim
is not totally accurate. For instance, Cortex-A53 is actually
capable of executing instructions in speculation, but it does
not allow to use the result of a speculated instruction for
subsequent operations, probably due to the absence of register
renaming and the short CPU pipeline. For instance the CPU
may speculatively request the memory subsystem to load from
#A+R0, but the result of the memory operation cannot be
used in speculation, hence LD[#B+R2] is stalled until the
branch condition is resolved. For this reason, the load from
#A+R0, whose address is not confidential, can affect the cache,
while the load from LD[#B+R2], whose address may contain
confidential data, cannot. This makes the original version of
Spectre ineffective on ARM Cortex-A53.
IV. SISCLOAK
The discussion above does not answer a more general
question: do Cortex-A53 cores prevent all leakage due to
speculation? Here we show that the answer is no and we
provide two similar counterexamples. The first counterexample
is the following program:
R1 = LD[#A-size]
if (R0 < R1)
R2 = LD[#A+R0]
if (R2 & 0x80000000)
R3 = LD[#B+R2]
In this case we assume that array B does not contain confi-
dential data, that every element of A is a valid index into the
array B, and that the attacker controls the value of register
R0. We also assume that the highest bit of each element of
A identifies the classification of the element itself, i.e. the
element is public only if the highest bit is set. This program is
considered secure at the ISA level as it ensures that R0 always
lies within the bounds of #A and that no memory access
depends of non-public information. However, we discovered
that on Cortex-A53 this program is not secure. In fact, the
CPU may mispredict condition R2 & 0x80000000 which
leads to consider a confidential element is public. In this
case, the CPU may speculatively access #B+R2, making the
confidential data in R2 affect the cache.
The second counterexample (which was also previously
presented but not experimented in [1]) is a variation of Spectre
PHT:
R1 = LD[#A-size]
R2 = LD[#A+R0]
if (R0 < R1)
R3 = LD[#B+R2]
With respect Spectre PHT, the access R2 = LD[#A+R0] has
been anticipated by the programmer or the compiler. In this
case, a Cortex-A53 CPU may mispredict condition R0 < R1
and speculatively access #B+R2, which may contain data that
has been read out-of-bound.
V. EXPERIMENTATION
We conducted our experiments on Raspberry Pi 3, which is
a widely available ARMv8 embedded system. The platform’s
CPU is a Cortex-A53, and according to the reference manual it
is an 8-stage pipelined processor with a 2-way superscalar and
in-order execution pipeline. The CPU also implements branch
prediction and a performance monitor counter (PMC) which
we used for timing analysis.
Our experimentation platform runs as bare-metal code, there
are no background processes or interrupts. In fact, our goal is
to show that these speculative leakages exist and we leave
their practical exploitation as future work. Similar to the
original Spectre PHT attack we mistrain the branch predictor
by executing the victim code in a loop with valid inputs,
thereby training the branch predictor to expect that conditional
expression will be true. Next we execute the victim code with
malicious inputs. While according to the processor reference
manual speculative execution of the code residing in true
branch should not happen with malicious input, we observed
different effects at the microarchitectural level.
In order to collect evidence that speculative execution of
code after the conditional expression happens, we initially used
ARM TrustZone and we exploited privileged debug instruc-
tions to directly inspect the cache state. Later we simulated a
real attack, were we used timing analysis to leak the secret.
This is done using Flush+Reload attack, where the attacker
invalidates shared cache lines, causes the execution of the
victim code, and then measures the timing of a later access to
the shared lines. If the access time to the shared lines incurs
shorter latency, the attacker can infer which lines have been
accessed by the victim. To access timing information we used
the cycle counter of Cortex-A53 PMC, which allows us to
accurately measure latency of memory accesses.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We show two new speculative vulnerabilities that affect the
ARM Cortex-A53 processor. This invalidates common beliefs
regarding the immunity of this processor against Spectre-like
attacks. Our experiments show that Cortex-A53 speculatively
executes instructions located after a conditional expression
which needs to load its operands from the memory. However,
the length of this speculative execution is limited to at most
two instructions; if one of the two instructions is a load from a
cacheable memory address then the corresponding cache-line
is speculatively filled with values from the memory.
RESPONSIBLE DISCLOSURE
SiSCloak was responsibly disclosed to ARM by the authors
on June 2020. As part of the disclosure process, ARM con-
firmed that the Cortex-A53 is vulnerable to attacks based on
single speculative memory loads, as described in this report.
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